Understanding the rise of Indonesian Foreign Terrorist Fighter: Political Economy, Market Analysis and Theory of Change Approach

Muhammad Hilmy Bramantyo
Global Crime and Justice, University of York, United Kingdom
Corresponding author: m.hilmy.bramantyo@gmail.com

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Abstract
The issue of terrorism in Indonesia has escalated from causing problems in its home country to other countries. These new groups of terrorists are called Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). The qualitative method used in this paper to analyse the emergence of Indonesian FTFs to Syria to fight alongside the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by using the theoretical framework of Political Economy Analysis (PEA), Market Analysis (MA), and Theory of Change. By using PEA, it could be argued that at the macro, sectoral, and micro levels, the emergence of Indonesian FTFs is inevitable. The use of MA also supports the emergence of Indonesian FTFs and how to intervene in them. Finally, this paper argued the theory of change to stop the flow of Indonesian FTFs, namely deterrence for supporters of Indonesian FTFs, communicate effectively with people influenced by terrorist doctrine, and change the culture by redefining the concept of jihad and applying it to the current Islamic education curriculum. Despite the fact that Indonesian FTFs to Syria have ceased since the defeat of ISIS, this paper argues that PEA, MA, and the Theory of Change can be used to analyse the future movement of Indonesian FTFs and to take preventative measures against it.

Introduction

Terrorism has been an ongoing issue in Indonesia. Since the Bali bombing in 2002, a chain of terrorism events has happened in Indonesia, although the number of deaths and wounded is not as high as the Bali bombing with 209 victims. Despite a decrease in the number of casualties from terrorist acts in recent years, terrorism remains a significant threat to Indonesia's

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security as extremist ideologies continue to proliferate. There is an extreme viewpoint that believes Indonesia should adopt sharia law as the country’s foundation. This viewpoint is promoted by extremist clerics, and this has arguably always been a seed of terrorism in Indonesia and waiting for the right time to grow. The seed of new extremist groups in Indonesia has emerged since the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, which deploys the ideology of the caliphate (a single ruler or kingdom for Muslims around the world). This ideology has spread among Indonesian extremist clerics who have formed pengajian (Islamic study groups) and inspired some of their students or followers to flee to Syria to fight alongside ISIS. However, flying to Syria was not easy and required some money. Therefore, the ISIS leader then ordered any Muslims to do jihad in each country. Following that, ISIS-inspired terrorist groups such as Jemaah Anshar Daulat, West Indonesia Mujahideen, East Indonesia Mujahideen, and Jemaah Anshar Tawhid emerged and committed terrorist acts in Indonesia. The following are the terrorist groups responsible for terrorist events in Indonesia from 2015 to 2020, or since ISIS emerged in Syria in July 2014:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Number of Death</th>
<th>Number of Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Anshar Daulat</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Indonesia Mujahideen</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Anshar Daulat or East Indonesia Mujahideen</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darul Islam</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indonesia Mujahideen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Anshar Daulat or Jemaah Anshar Tawhid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>91</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The debate over the definition of terrorism has shifted from violent acts in the name of ideology or nationality to acts of violence committed in the name of certain religions, intending to instill fear in the public and interfere with legitimate government. However, the definition of terrorism should be returned to the United Nations, as stated in UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), which provides the following definition:

Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

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3 Schulze and Liow, “Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad.”
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government gives a definition of terrorism through National Law No. 5 of 2018 as stated below:

Terrorism is an act that uses violence or threats of violence with intention to creates an atmosphere of terror or fear, cause mass casualties, damage or destruction of strategically vital objects, environment, public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political, or other motives security disturbance.

From the two definitions above, the similarity of the definition described above is stated in the harm caused to society due to the violence which could cause injury or even death. However, the scholar has a wide range of debate regarding the definition of terrorism. Stampnitzky argued that defining terrorism should be linked to three key elements in which terrorism is defined as illegitimate violence committed by the enemy with a political motive. Meanwhile, Brown defines terrorism as closely related to religious action, where he distinguishes between ‘secular terrorists’ and ‘religious terrorist’. The consequence of Brown’s work is that terrorism is always attached to both religious and nonreligious views. However, Gofas argued that the form of terrorism is more complex than only separating between religious and nonreligious views. Gofas introduces the concept of old and new terrorism types by dividing them into five elements, as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>“Old” Terrorism</th>
<th>“New” Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Structure</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Networked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Range</td>
<td>Within home region</td>
<td>Outside home region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial orientation</td>
<td>Transnational orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motives</td>
<td>Political/Nationalist Ideology</td>
<td>Religious Fanaticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Restrained Violence</td>
<td>Extreme Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards Westphalian System</td>
<td>System-Affirming</td>
<td>System-Threatening</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Table 2, the operational range of "new" terrorism could extend beyond the conflict zone, which means it may involve a transnational flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) which is the focus of the flow in this essay. According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) FTFs are someone:

who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training.

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9 Ibid., 21
Furthermore, Hegghammer defines FTFs as someone who joins a conflict, does not share citizenship with the opposing country, has no affiliation with a military force, and is not paid by any entity. Thus, FTFs frequently volunteer to fight on the battlefields of other countries. This paper will focus on the flow of Indonesian FTFs to Syria to fight alongside with ISIS. Using qualitative method and the framework of political economy analysis (PEA) and market analysis (MA) from Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), the main objective of this paper is to seek an explanation for the rise of Indonesian FTFs using PEA and MA, examine its harm, and determine a method to intervene using the theory of change.

This paper will be divided into five sections, including an introduction. After explaining the background of the flow of Indonesian FTFs to Syria, the second section will discuss the PEA between Indonesia and Syria which encourages Indonesian FTFs to Syria. Having explained about PEA related to the flow of Indonesian FTFs, section three examines MA at the price for Indonesian FTFs to embark to Syria, market entry which explains the requirement to be recruited as FTFs, violence that happened within FTFs, protection of ISIS from the Syrian government, and the legitimation of FTFs by Indonesian extremist clerics. It is also important to discuss the level of harm caused by Indonesian FTFs both in Indonesia and Syria, as well as the priority to intervene which discusses in the fourth section. The theory of change will further discuss in fifth section where this theory provides appropriate solutions to intervene and avoid the flow of Indonesian FTFs. The final section concludes the discussion of this paper.

**Political Economy Analysis (PEA)**

Before examining terrorism and the flow of Indonesian FTFs, it is important to understand the position of terrorist organisations within Indonesian society. According to Lampe (2016) organised crime is embedded in society, therefore crime does not emerge from empty space, but there is a catalyst within society. Below is the figure of the constellation of organised crime in society:

![Figure 1. The constellation of organized criminal in society](image)

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Terrorism in Indonesia arguably in the position of no. 2 where networks are embedded in marginalised sub-cultures. Hadiz and Robison argued that the idea of terrorism in Indonesia emerged from marginalised urban. Since Indonesia is the nation with the largest population of Muslims, it is important to distinguish between extremist Muslims (who claimed the terror act) and fundamentalism before discussing the cause of terrorism, or else the terminology of Muslim will mostly be embedded within the culture of violence and terrorism. However, many scholars such as Hekmatpour and Burns, Delia Deckard and Jacobson, and Pratt tend to state that extremist and fundamentalist Islam are the same and have the same roots in violence and terrorism. The fundamentalist Muslim is “the believer does take religion seriously” whereas the extremist means that the group believes in ideology and uses violence “to obtain and hold on to power”.

From these two definitions, it could be argued that fundamentalist and extremist have distinct meanings. Although terrorist groups claimed that they were fundamentalist Muslims, the political motive is embedded in their acts of terror. From this point, the idea of terrorism and consequently the emergence of Indonesian FTFs are embedded only in marginal subcultures.

After examining the idea of terrorism in society, this paper will then examine the PEA at the macro, sectoral, and micro levels, both in Indonesia and Syria. From a macro level, it could be argued that the oppression under the New Order regime led by former President Suharto towards political Islam caused the emergence of terrorist groups in Indonesia. After Suharto and his military exterminated the Communist Party in 1966, the New Order regime turned to suppression against political Islam because it was the only ideology left that was regarded as a political threat. Resulting from this oppression by Suharto’s regime was the birth of a terrorist group called Darul Islam that historically has consistently attempted to overthrow the government by establishing its own shariah country. Then Darul Islam (DI) was divided into a small faction called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which was established in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. The name JI became well-known after this group destroyed
nightclubs in Bali in 2002 and dominated terrorism cases ten years later. Since ISIS emerged in Syria, other terrorist groups which support ISIS’s ideology of caliphate have emerged, such as Jemaah Anshar Daulat, East Indonesia Mujahdeen, and West Indonesia Mujahdeen. These three groups were responsible for the flow of Indonesian FTFs to Syria.

On a sectoral level, the Indonesian government’s Islamophobia could be viewed as a catalyst for the emergence of terrorist groups. Since the Bali bombing in 2002, Islamophobia has formed within society. This condition happened because Indonesian terrorist groups used Islamic symbols and appearances while committing the terror act. Post-Suharto’s government also kept a legacy of seeing the Islam movement as a political threat. It could be seen when the Indonesian government banned two Islamic political groups called Hizbut Tahrir and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) respectively in 2017 and 2020 where both groups emphasise the unification of Muslims in Indonesia as a political group against corrupt government.

From the micro level, the existence of an extreme pengajian (Islamic study group) within society works as a catalyst in the rise of terrorist groups. This is shown in a study by Hwang and Schulze which found that certain extremist Muslim schools in Indonesia contributed to the emergence of extremist groups through their Islamic study sessions. These study sessions often focused on the concept of “jihad” (in general terms, struggle) and “caliphate”, which led to extreme religious behaviour. However, the concept of jihad taught in these schools often distorted its original meaning from the struggle to stay on the path of God, to emphasise the war against regimes that opposed Islam. According to Bonner and Esposito, extremist groups have exploited and ingrained this distortion of the concept of jihad. These three features of Indonesia’s political economy collectively explain the emergence of extremist and terrorist groups in Indonesia. When ISIS emerged and called for all Muslims around the world to join and defend ISIS as the legitimate caliphate, it encouraged Indonesians who were interested to join and become FTFs.

From Syria perspective, it could be argued that Syria’s political situation has contributed to the rise of ISIS. At a macro level, Syria’s governance has been characterised by authoritarian rule, with the al-Assad regime in power since 1971. Hafez al-Assad led Syria from 1971 to

24 Hwang and Schulze, “Why They Join.”
2000, and his son, Bashar al-Assad, has continued his regime until the present day. The Arab Spring of 2010 caused many Arab countries to call for the government to resign. This included demonstrations in Syria to remove Bashar al-Assad from power. The al-Assad regime, on the other hand, reacted brutally towards this demonstration by assaulted civilians and destroying public buildings such as schools and hospitals.  

At the sectoral level, al-Assad’s economic policies only benefited those within the regime and neglected rural communities, leading to the abandonment of the agricultural sector, which rural people typically relied on for income.  

On the micro level, the society was divided into two major sects—Sunni and Shiite—where Shiites are the minority in Syria. However, when Hafez al-Assad secured the power in 1970, this was seen as the victory for Shiites, which “had long been marginalised and reviled”  

Since al-Assad’s regime was established in 1970, it has always oppressed the Sunni, which is the majority sect in Syria. From Syria’s perspective on PEA, these three factors could explain the emergence of ISIS, which later invited Muslims around the world to join and defend ISIS as the legitimate caliphate.

Based on PEA of each country, it could be argued that the emergence of ISIS in Syria and its ideology played a role in the flow of Indonesian FTFs to Syria. The following section will explore the MA of terrorism between Indonesia and Syria.

**Market Analysis (MA)**

In the frame of MA, the analysis of input prices which could fuel the function of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) is important and could disrupt the development of TOC itself. It could be argued that ISIS could exist and ‘operate’ to commit terror attacks from July 2014 until its defeat in 2017 by Iraqi Security Forces, because this organisation obtained funding support. According to Khan and Ruiz Estrada, ISIS’s source of funding comes from the sale of oil and gas, which could generate around US$3,000,000 in daily revenue. Furthermore, ISIS’s source of funding also comes from the agriculture sector, whose main products are wheat and barley. In 2015, ISIS predictably obtained US$56 million from these two products. Since ISIS has the resources to operate as a terrorist group, it has been enabled and emboldened to welcome FTFs who are interested in joining. Furthermore, ISIS created propaganda to describe the good quality of life under ISIS’ rule which makes FTFs more interested in joining.

On the other hand, before 2018 there was no prohibition for Indonesians to go abroad to join a terrorist group. However, after the inauguration of National Law No. 5 of 2018, it is...
clearly stated that Indonesians who join terrorist groups abroad will be penalised. Using this regulatory loophole, there have been approximately 600 Indonesian FTFs in Syria since the emergence of ISIS in 2014. 36 According to the sentence from the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia no. 263/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt Tim., one of the FTFs testified that he had prepared Rp120,000,000 (£6.475) to enter Syria. The funds are allocated for the purchase of multiple plane tickets (Indonesia-Thailand-Iran), preparations for crossing into Syria, and an emergency fund. The source of the funds was either a private fund or a contribution from an ISIS sympathiser.

Market entry analysis on MA is used to determine the ease with which a person can enter the market as well as the gatekeeper who controls the market. 37 Schulze and Liow further explore the ease with which ISIS supporters and Indonesian FTFs can be recruited from Islamic study groups and seminars. 38 In these two events, extremist clerics explained the ISIS curriculum, which discussed lessons such as the importance of the caliphate and martyrdom. Then, the clerics will take an oath from his students or followers to support ISIS’s existence. The process to get ISIS’s supporters is straightforward, furthermore, the students and the followers themselves are willing to take an oath to support ISIS. This is shown in the interview with an extremist cleric conducted by Schulze and Liow. Thus, it could be argued that the belief in ISIS as the legitimate caliphate, which extreme clerics has spread through Islamic study groups and seminars, contributed to the flow of Indonesian FTFs to Syria.

Violence as an element in MA of a TOC group is critical because violence analysis could describe the level of success in an intervention programme. However, if there is no evidence of violence in the market, it is an indicator that the state is protecting the flow of crime organised by TOC. In this context, there is no evidence of violence in the flow of Indonesian FTFs to fly to Syria and fight with ISIS. However, it does not mean that Indonesian authorities take part in the flow. Before Indonesian authorities issued National Law No. 5 of 2018 about the amendment of previous terrorism law, Indonesian government did not have certain legislation to prohibit its citizens from taking part in another countries warfare, including Syria. 39 Furthermore, the movement of Indonesian FTFs is not detected by Indonesian authorities because they use proxy countries such as Malaysia or Thailand before embarking to Turkey. After arriving in Turkey, they take a route to Hatay province which has a direct border with Syria. 40 Based on previous fact, it could be argued that Indonesian authorities could not determine the real purpose of its citizens to fly to Malaysia or Thailand, since both countries are routine tourist destination. 41

From the element of protection in MA, it is well known that al-Assad regime actively protected and sponsored terrorist groups long before the ISIS emerged in 2014. The protection includes “weapons, safe havens, and financial support” 42 The same pattern also happened when

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38 Schulze and Liow, “Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad.”
ISIS emerged, where al-Assad regime did not seriously target ISIS. The first reason is because al-Assad regime has a business relationship with ISIS by trading oil and wheat from the region controlled by ISIS. Furthermore, the indication of al-Assad’s regime to maintain ISIS existence is also shown in the FATF report where there were still 20 Syrian financial institutions operating in the region where ISIS has full control. It could be argued that the connection to financial services ensured the continued ability of terrorist organisations such as ISIS to operate and conduct terror, as money considered as the “blood” for organisation. The consequence of protection from al-Assad regime is that foreign fighters from countries throughout the world, including Indonesia, could gain access to enter ISIS region.

The last element of MA is legitimacy, where TOC could obtain legitimacy from a certain population. The flow of Indonesian FTFs who fly to Syria started when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claimed himself in the sermon as a caliphate for Muslims around the world. He also emphasised the importance of defending the caliphate and called all Muslims one Ummah (one community). After ISIS emerged, Indonesian clerics organised an Islamic study group which emphasised the importance of Muslims defending and joining ISIS as caliphate in Syria. If the student in this study group is interested in joining ISIS and flying to Syria, an assessment will be conducted by the clerics to see the level of seriousness of the student to join ISIS and become FTFs.

Harm Analysis

The flow of Indonesian FTFs not only harms the destination country, Syria, where the combatants flew to fight along with ISIS, but also harms the Indonesian society as well. This section will discuss the harm analysis of the Indonesian FTFs flow from the perspectives of two countries: Indonesia and Syria. From Indonesia’s perspective, there are two societal harms: the exacerbation of spreading extreme ideology and Islamophobia. Meanwhile, from Syria’s perspective, the plunge in economic performance during the period of ISIS existence will be considered economic harm.

The number of Indonesian combatants who flew to Syria from 2014 to 2018 was approximately 1,605, whereas the number of returnees during the same period was 344. The main problem is the returnee, which could cause societal harm since they are now able to exacerbate the spread of the extreme ideology, have combat experience, and are equipped with the skills to create or use weapons; all these aspects derive from their experience while fighting with ISIS in Syria. The returnees arguably could build a new cell of a terrorist group, influence another person to join an extreme Islamic study group, and commit a future terror act.

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45 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing.”
48 Rahmanto, Meliala, and Lolo, “Ideology Deconstruction of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Returnees in Indonesia.”
49 Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia.”
Furthermore, the returnee could face negative stigmatisation from society which could hinder the process of reintegration into society. The negative impact of this stigma is that ISIS returnee felt isolated, which could push them to commit for another terror act.\textsuperscript{51} The emergence of ISIS, the establishment of several Indonesian terrorist groups such as Jemaah Anshar Daulat and Jemaah Anshar Khilafah followed by terror acts, and the number of Indonesian combatants who flew to Syria, create Islamophobia within society although Indonesia is well-known as the most populous Muslim country.\textsuperscript{52} Islam is then seen as an extreme religion that teaches hatred towards people outside Islam and spreads the notion of violence because terrorists use Islamic attributes while committing terror acts. Moreover, Islamophobia symptoms are shown intensely in social media\textsuperscript{53}, curriculum in elementary education\textsuperscript{54} and even political movements\textsuperscript{55}. Based on this fact, it could be argued that the flow of Indonesian combatants to Syria combined with the intense terror acts by terrorist groups created Islamophobia which is considered societal harm.

On the other hand, Syria also suffered from the departure of foreign fighters from around the world, including Indonesia. The Syrian economy is arguably suffering as a result of increased terror from ISIS and the arrival of foreign fighters who bring more violence to Syria. According to Khan and Ruiz Estrada, economic performance has declined since the rise of ISIS, this notion is parallel with Devadas, Elbadawi and Loayza's finding.\textsuperscript{56} The figure below shows the comparison of economic performance pre- and post-ISIS:

\textbf{Figure 2. The Comparison of Economic Growth Rate Pre and Post ISIS}\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure2.png}
\caption{The Comparison of Economic Growth Rate Pre and Post ISIS}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{52} Shukri, “The Perception of Indonesian Youths toward Islamophobia.”


\textsuperscript{55} Syarif, A. Mughni, and Hannan, “Post-Truth and Islamophobia Narration in the Contemporary Indonesian Political Constellation.”


\textsuperscript{57} Khan and Ruiz Estrada, “The Effects of Terrorism on Economic Performance.”
The long period of warfare not only caused the economic downturn but also the loss of human capital and infrastructure which are the main inputs for economic development. Furthermore, the long period of terror committed by ISIS also destroyed the infrastructure for energy which caused energy poverty. Access to energy is vital because it is considered an input for obtaining proper economic growth.

After examining the impact of the harm resulting from the flow of Indonesian combatants to Syria as outlined above, it is important to take steps for critical intervention to reduce the harm caused by the flow. Preventing the spread of extreme ideology is the most important step that the Indonesian government should take, because it will stop the flow of Indonesian FTF in the future and further, Syria will not suffer from the arrival of Indonesian FTFs which arguably could exacerbate the social and economic situation in Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian government could intervene economic harm by rebuilding economic sectors in Syria.

**Theory of Change and Appropriate Solutions**

Stopping the spread of extreme ideology may require a gradual approach. It begins with penalising those who spread extreme ideology and continues with intense communication and negotiation to deradicalize those who have been exposed to extreme ideology and spread it to society through media such as social media, websites, or Islamic study sessions. The theory of change analysis discusses in this section. Theory of change is an effort to “identify and make explicit the beliefs, assumptions and hypotheses about how change happens.” The first proposal to stop the spread of extreme ideology is to adopt the theory of change “Deterrence”. In terms of theories of change, deterrence means pursuing and punishing people involved in TOC with the primary goal of disengaging people who attempt to engage in TOC. Before Indonesian Law No. 5 of 2018 inaugurated, there was no penalisation for spreading extreme ideology. However, according to Law No. 5 of 2018, anyone who spreads extreme ideology will be punished. Thus, Law No. 5 of 2018 is able to close the loophole in addressing the spread of extreme ideology.

The second proposal to limit the extreme ideology is by applying "Manage adaptation of crime to minimise negative impacts on violence, security and conflict" from theory of change. One of the approaches that should be adopted is negotiation with TOC groups. In this context, it means the group of extremist Islamic study sessions that have been identified as ISIS supporters. Rucktäschel and Schuck argued that the use of negotiation or communication as a soft approach is vital in the effort to reduce harm due to terrorism in Indonesia. Communication and negotiation with ISIS supporters who have been exposed to extreme ideology could be effective if the former terrorist is involved in this meeting. The former terrorist who had been exposed to extreme ideology could play a vital role in helping the Indonesian Counterterrorism Agency run deradicalization programmes. The former terrorist arguably acknowledged when the person encounters extreme ideology and understands the methodology to deradicalize it. Furthermore, it is important to conduct a deradicalization programme for the returnee from Syria since deradicalization programme is not effective due...
to procedural programme 63 and a lack of competency from the official who assigned to deradicalize the ex-terrorist.64 As a result, the role of former terrorists is critical in managing the adaptation of extreme ideology.

The third proposal is adapting "cultural change" where TOC could develop itself because the community is supporting its existence. In this context, the spread of extreme ideology happened because this ideology was nurtured by the existence of extreme Islamic study groups 65 and Islamic boarding school (known as pesantren) which also lead by extremist clerics.66 Islamic study groups and boarding schools is depend on the knowledge of the clerics who teach in these two organisations. Thus, it is important for Indonesian government to develop contemporary Islamic curriculum for schools which emphasises the anti-radicalization lesson. Furthermore, it is important for the Indonesian government to redefine the concept of jihad from having a negative image (e.g., killing people outside warfare) into positive image (such as struggling to maintain self-control while in a difficult situation) and include it on contemporary Islamic curriculum. It could be argued that the definition of jihad has been narrowly misinterpreted intentionally by extremist clerics.67 Furthermore, the concept of "cultural change" is to persuade people who support extremist ideology to stop doing so because it has a negative impact on the perception of Islam.68

The fourth proposal is "economic transformation" to distribute welfare in Syria so that there is no sectarian conflict. Syria must prioritise economic growth. According to Devadas, Elbadawi and Loayza, if the conflict is resolved, Syria will grow at a rate of 6% per year.69 The resolution of Syria's conflict may entice foreign direct investment, which will boost economic performance.70 Furthermore, the Syrian government could focus on developing Syria's main sector, agriculture, which would attract workers, generate more income, and reduce poverty.71 However, it is critical to remember that economic transformation should be followed by welfare distribution and a reduction in the cronyism that has spread under the al-Assad regime. It could be argued that unequal welfare distribution, cronyism, and the persecution of certain sects all contributed to the formation of ISIS.72

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the phenomena of Indonesian FTFs to Syria by explaining it from political economy analysis (PEA), market analysis (MA), harm analysis, and theory of change.

68 Hatina, “Contesting Violence in Radical Islam.”
69 Devadas, Elbadawi, and Loayza, “Growth in Syria.”
72 Gerges, ISIS; Speckhard and Ellenberg, “The Effects of Assad’s Atrocities and the Call to Foreign Fighters to Come to Syria on the Rise and Fall of the ISIS Caliphate.”
Political economy analysis divides the rise of Indonesian FTFs from three levels: macro, sectoral, and micro. From a macro level, it could be argued that the oppression under the New Order regime led by former President Suharto towards political Islam caused the emergence of terrorist groups in Indonesia. At sectoral level, the Indonesian government's Islamophobia could be viewed as a catalyst for the emergence of terrorist groups and subsequently the Indonesian FTFs. Meanwhile, on the micro level, the existence of an extreme pengajian (Islamic study group) within society works as a catalyst in the rise of the Indonesian FTFs. Furthermore, the intervention to the rise of this group in the future could be explained from MA dimensions namely entry price, market entry, protection, and legitimacy. From entry price, since ISIS has enough resources to operate as a terrorist group, it has been enabled and emboldened to welcome FTFs who are interested in joining. From market entry, Schulze and Liow (2019) explore the ease with which ISIS supporters and Indonesian FTFs can be recruited from Islamic study groups and seminars. From protection dimension, it is well known that al-Assad regime actively protected and sponsored terrorist groups long before the ISIS emerged in 2014. The protection includes “weapons, safe havens, and financial support”.

Therefore, the Indonesian FTFs feel safe to go to Syria and join with ISIS. The last dimension is legitimacy where Indonesian clerics give legitimacy for their student to fight along with ISIS.

To stop the future Indonesian FTFs, it is important to apply theory of change propose by Midgley, Briscoe, and Bertoli. First is to create deterrence by punishing people engage for Indonesian FTFs. Secondly, by manage adaptation of crime to minimise negative impacts. The oppression towards Syrians and partiality towards certain sects shown by the al-Assad regime arguably contributed to the rise of ISIS. ISIS then utilizes this situation by spreading extreme ideology, which in turn attracts FTFs around the world to join and defend ISIS. After ISIS is defeated in 2019, the FTFs return to their hometown countries, including Indonesian FTFs, and they probably will spread and nurture the extreme ideology that poses a threat to the countries. Rucktäschel and Schuck argued that the use of negotiation or communication as a gentle approach is essential in Indonesia’s fight against terrorism. Communication and negotiation with ISIS supporters who have been exposed to extreme ideology could be effective if the former terrorist is engaged in this meeting. Third, by using cultural change. In this context, the Indonesian government must develop a contemporary Islamic school curriculum emphasising the anti-radicalization lesson. Furthermore, it is important for the Indonesian government to redefine the concept of jihad from having a negative image (e.g., killing people outside warfare) into a positive image (such as struggling to maintain self-control while in a difficult situation) and include it in the contemporary Islamic curriculum. Although Indonesian FTFs to Syria have stopped since ISIS was defeated, this paper argues that using PEA, MA, and the Theory of Change is useful to analyse the future movement of Indonesian FTFs and take precautionary action to stop it.

References


73 Hadiz, “Towards a Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia”; Hadiz and Teik, “Approaching Islam and Politics from Political Economy.”

74 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing.”, 465.


